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Strategic	Manoeuvres	and	Impression	Management:	
Communication	Approaches	in	the	Case	of	a	Crisis	Event	
O’Connell,	B.,	De Lange, P., Stoner,	G.,	Sangster, A. 
ABSTRACT	
This	historical	study	examines	the	actions	of	the	Australian	former	asbestos	
company,	James	Hardie,	when	faced	with	a	potentially	ruinous	corporate	scandal	
between	2001	and	2007.	The	company	became	vilified	as	public	awareness	grew	
of	the	damage	to	public	health	its	use	of	asbestos	had	caused.	In	response,	it	set-
up	a	knowingly	underfunded	compensation	fund	supported	by	a	strategy	of	
misinformation	and	denial.	Its	actions	are	analysed	using	Oliver’s	typology	of	
strategic	responses	and	theories	of	crisis	management	and	crisis	
communications,	providing	insights	into	the	company’s	motivations	for	adopting	
strategies	that	took	it	to	the	brink	of	financial	collapse.		
1. Introduction
This	subject	of	this	study	is	the	Australian	asbestos	company,	James	Hardie,	
which	found	itself	fighting	for	its	survival	throughout	a	lengthy	period	of	media-
led	criticism	as	its	products	became	publically	recognised	as	killing	people	while	
it	responded	with	defiance.	The	confrontation	reached	crisis	levels	in	the	late	
1990s/early	2000s	and	culminated	in	the	findings	of	a	public	inquiry	being	
published	in	2004	that	confirmed	the	extent	to	which	the	company	had	breached	
acceptable	practice	in	maintaining	its	innocence	and	evading	responsibility.	
Ultimately,	the	company	survived,	but	at	considerable	cost,	not	just	to	it,	but	to	
the	thousands	who	suffered	and	died	as	a	result	of	its	actions.	
For	long-term	survival,	businesses	must	be	flexible	and	inventive	in	
response	to	a	variety	of	threats,	including	changes	in	the	marketplace,	new	
entrants,	and	competing	products	and	services,	both	new	and	old.	While	many	do	
so	in	the	short	and	medium	term,	relatively	few	survive	longer	than	a	few	
decades	without	substantial	change.	This	can	be	seen	regularly	in	the	changing	
landscape	of	the	stores	in	the	major	streets	of	cities	across	the	world,	as	tastes	
change	and	businesses	fail	to	react	quickly	enough	with	changes	in	their	
approach	and	to	the	products	and	services	they	sell.	The	decline	may	be	slow	and	
gradual,	or	it	can	be	rapid,	as	in	the	case	of	the	world’s	major	bookstores,	most	of	
which	have	closed	over	the	past	decade	as	they	failed	to	complete	with	the	twin	
threat	of	internet-based	outlets	and	electronic	readers.	However,	in	some	cases,	
it	is	not	just	the	nature	of	competition	and	changes	in	the	marketplace	that	
threaten	survival.		
Legislation	may	be	introduced	for	a	variety	of	reasons.	In	the	case	of	
products	found	to	affect	the	health	of	those	exposed	to	them	it	is	usually	a	two-
step	process,	with	lobbying	and	litigation	preceding	the	introduction	of	
legislation,	something	that	only	occurs	once	evidence	of	harm	is	available,	often	a	
considerable	time	after	victims	first	begin	to	suffer	and	complain.	Cigarette	
manufacturers,	for	example,	have	been	the	target	of	health-issues-led	lobbying	
and	litigation	for	much	longer	than	legislation	has	been	in	place	restricting	their	
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use,	and	so	have	manufacturers	and	users	of	another	product,	asbestos.	Asbestos	
was	used	routinely	in	building	construction,	and	in	products	sold	to	do-it-
yourself	enthusiasts	as	recently	as	the	late-20th	century.	In	the	US,	a	ban	on	use	of	
some	asbestos	materials	was	introduced	in	1973,	but	its	use	is	still	not	
completely	prohibited.	Elsewhere,	although	Asbestos	Industry	Regulations	were	
issued	in	19331,	it	was	not	until	1999	that	its	use	was	banned	in	the	UK.	In	
Australia,	the	first	asbestos	regulations	were	introduced	in	the	1970s2	but	its	use	
was	not	prohibited	until	2003.	The	European	Union	banned	use	of	asbestos	in	
2005.	Where	products	that	damage	health	are	concerned,	lobbying	and	litigation	
do	not	stop	with	the	passing	of	legislation.	One	damages-limitation	tactic	
adopted	by	companies	that	are,	or	expect	to	be	found	liable	for	the	use	of	such	
products,	is	the	establishment	of	a	trust	fund	to	cover	any	compensation	claims	
and	judgments	made	against	it.	
One	asbestos-related	example	is	from	the	UK,	the	Turner	&	Newall	group	
(T&N).3	T&N	was	aware	of	health	concerns	from	the	early	decades	of	the	20th	
century	and,	following	the	much	reported	and	discussed	death	of	one	of	its	
workers	from	asbestos	poisoning	in	1924,4	it	set-up	an	internal	liabilities	fund	
for	worker	compensation	in	1931.	The	perceived	need	for	the	scheme	was	
diminished	but	not	eliminated	by	the	establishment	of	the	UK	Government’s	
National	Insurance	scheme	in	1948.	However,	the	liabilities	were	not	considered	
to	be	a	serious	concern	for	survival	of	its	business:	“until	at	least	the	1960s	the	
company	never	adequately	compensated	workers”	[even	though]	“the	board	[of	
directors]	was	generous	to	its	shareholders,	especially	to	the	holders	of	the	
ordinary	shares”.5	Nevertheless,	by	the	early	1980s,	T&N	had	come	to	view	
asbestos-based	compensation	claims	as	a	clear	and	publicly	admitted	risk.6		
In	Australia,	it	took	longer	for	asbestos	companies	to	recognise	the	health	
issues	relating	to	asbestos,	that	it	was	killing	people,	never	mind	making	them	ill;	
and	even	longer	for	them	to	acknowledge	them	in	the	form	of	recognising	
significant	corporate	liabilities.	As	mentioned	at	the	beginning	of	this	
Introduction,	the	subject	of	this	paper	is	one	such	Australian	company,	James	
Hardie	Group	(JH),	a	company	that	“lag[ged]	behind	T&N,	in	terms	of	the	shifting	
meaning	ascribed	to	asbestos”.7		
This	paper	presents	a	historiography	of	James	Hardie.	It	looks	at	the	
institutional	processes	that	impacted	upon	it	when	faced	by	litigation	relating	to	
asbestos	exposure,	and	considers	the	disclosures	and	actions	it	adopted.	In	order	
to	distinguish	and	clarify	the	various	strategic	responses	of	the	company,	this	
study	adopts	Oliver’s	institutional	theory	model	which	defines	five	forms	of	
                                                
1	Tweedale	and	Hansen,	“Protecting	the	workers”.	
2	ASCC,	“Asbestos	management	and	control”.	
3	See,	for	example,	Jeremy	“Corporate	Responses“;	Warren,	“The	Enforcement”;	Tweedale	and	
Hansen,	“Protecting	the	workers”;	Tweedale	and	Warren,	”A	Case	in	Point”;	Tweedale	and	
Jeremy,	“Compensating	the	Workers”.	
4	Tweedale	and	Hansen,	“Protecting	the	workers”.	
5	Tweedale	and	Jeremy,	“Compensating	the	Workers”,	113-114.	
6	Moerman	and	van	der	Laan,	Accounting	and	Long-tail	Liabilities;	Moerman,	van	der	Laan,	and	
Campbell,	“A	tale”.	
7	Moerman,	van	der	Laan,	and	Campbell,	“A	tale”,	983.	
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organisational	reaction	to	pressures	toward	conformity:	manipulation,	defiance,	
avoidance,	compromise,	and	acquiescence.8	Circumstances	dictate	whether	any	
one,	or	a	combination	of	these	strategies,	may	be	appropriate	at	any	given	time.	
Acquiescence	is	the	typical	approach9	but,	in	the	case	of	James	Harvey	Group,	
having	tried	to	isolate	the	company	from	any	asbestos-related	liability	by	
relocating	its	operations	overseas,	it	then	adopted	a	solution	consistent	with	new	
institutional	sociology	(NIS)	whereby	it	adopted	"structures	and	procedures	that	
are	valued	in	[its]	social	and	cultural	environment...	in	order	to	achieve	legitimacy	
and	to	secure	the	resources	that	are	essential	for	[its]	survival".10		
Taking	its	lead	from	T&N’s	internal	liabilities	fund,	JH’s	compensation	
scheme	was	far	more	complex:	a	special	purpose	fund	intended	to	quarantine	the	
company	and,	in	particular,	its	assets,	from	potential	claimants.11	It	was	named,	
the	‘Medical	Research	and	Compensation	Foundation’	(MRCF).	When	created	in	
2001,	it	was	knowingly	under-resourced.	In	response,	the	company	attempted	to	
manipulate	perceptions	of	the	capability	of	the	fund	to	meet	the	liabilities	it	was	
supposed	to	address.	Over	the	next	six	years	it	variously	used	manipulation,	
defiance,	avoidance,	and	compromise	to	finally	reach	an	arrangement	acceptable	
to	itself	and	its	key	stakeholders.	
Four	research	questions	are	addressed	in	the	course	of	this	study:	
1. What	was	the	nature	of	the	actions	taken	by	the	company	in	dealing	with	the	
asbestos	issue	during	the	period	from	2001	through	to	the	settlement	with	
asbestos	sufferers	agreed	in	February	2007?		
2. To	what	extent	did	JH’s	public	disclosures	pertaining	to	its	asbestos	liabilities	
change	across	this	period?	
3. What	factors	motivated	the	actions	taken	by	the	company?	
4. How	might	the	changes	in	actions	and	public	disclosures	taken	by	JH	be	
explained	by	the	corporate	crisis	management	and	crisis	response	
communications	literature?	
In	addressing	these	four	questions,	annual	report	disclosures,	company	
media	releases,	and	evidence	presented	to	a	high-profile	public	inquiry	into	the	
James	Hardie	Group,	the	Special	Commission	of	Inquiry	into	the	Medical	Research	
and	Compensation	Foundation12	are	used	to	present	and	analyse	the	
historiography	of	the	company’s	corporate	disclosures,	revealing	detailed	
insights	into	the	changing	strategies	employed	by	this	organisation	in	dealing	
with	the	issues	it	faced.		
1.1. Contribution	
                                                
8	Oliver,	“Strategic	Responses”.	
9	For	example,	Guerreiro,	Rodrigues,	and	Craig,	“Voluntary	adoption	of	IFRS”.	
10	Ribeiro	and	Scapens,	“Institutional	theories”,	96.	
11	In	contrast,	many	former	asbestos	manufacturers	including	the	US	companies	Johns	Manville	
and	Federal-Mogul		(who	had	acquired	the	UK	asbestos	company	Turner	&	Newel)	had	initially	
sought	to	remove	themselves	from	liability	to	claimants	through	the	mechanism	of	strategic	
bankruptcy.		
12	The	Special	Commission	of	Inquiry	into	James	Hardie	Group	was	a	judicial	inquiry	
commissioned	on	the	12th	February	2004	by	the	New	South	Wales	State	Government.	
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This	paper	contributes	to	the	business	history,	institutional,	crisis	management,	
and	crisis	communications	literature	in	several	ways.	Firstly,	it	presents	details	
of	how	a	major	national	company	managed	its	way	through	a	potential	minefield	
of	litigation.	In	doing	so,	it	is	one	of	only	a	few	studies	that	examine	the	volatile	
and	pressured	environment	that	evolves	when	a	highly	publicised	product	
liability	scandal	occurs.	Previous	studies	have	generally	examined	the	voluntary	
disclosure	responses	of	organisations	as	a	means	by	which	they	hope	to	repair	
organisational	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	their	stakeholders.13	Analysis	in	those	
studies	has	generally	been	limited	to	the	effects	of	the	institutional	environment	
on	structural	conformity	and	isomorphism,	with	only	a	limited	assessment	of	the	
role	of	active	agency	and	resistance.14	In	contrast,	the	present	study	uses	Oliver’s	
typology	of	strategic	responses15	to	categorise	particular	responses	by	James	
Hardie	over	the	six-year	period	when	it	was	actively	seeking	to	establish	a	trust	
to	quarantine	itself	from	litigation.	It	does	so	by	examining	a	situation	where	
active	agency	and	resistance	were	at	the	core	of	the	organisation’s	strategic	
response	to	the	threats	that	it	faced,	one	that	involved	a	specific	mechanism	of	
choice,	an	aspect	of	new	institutional	sociology	on	which	the	literature	has	been	
largely	silent.16		
Secondly,	it	connects	theory	and	research	from	multiple	domains	including	
crisis	management,	crisis	communications,	and	strategic	response	by	focussing	
upon	an	unsuccessful	attempt	at	managing	public	expectations,	rather	than	the	
dominant	approach	in	this	literature	that	has	a	focus	upon	how	corporations	
successfully	manage	public	expectations	around	scandals	of	this	type.17	
Furthermore,	it	is	rare	for	a	study	of	such	a	situation	to	be	conducted	through	the	
lens	of	both	data	sourced	from	the	company	itself	and	an	independent	
Commission	of	Inquiry.		
Thirdly,	while	some	studies	into	product	liability	scandals	have	been	located	
elsewhere,	such	as	the	studies	of	T&N	in	the	UK,	most	of	these	studies	have	
focused	on	the	US	and	therefore	reflect	a	particularly	litigious	environment	that	
results	in	the	actions	of	corporations	and	their	alleged	victims	being	heavily	
influenced	by	its	very	existence.	The	US	legal	system	allows	Chapter	11	
bankruptcy	protection	which	has	readily	been	employed	by	asbestos	implicated	
corporations	in	that	jurisdiction.	In	contrast,	the	present	study	contributes	to	
this	body	of	literature	by	examining	a	product	liability	case	in	a	different	and	less	
litigious	environment,	Australia.		
Finally,	this	study	complements	the	James	Hardie	studies	of	Moerman	&	van	
der	Laan18	and	Moerman,	van	der	Laan,	and	Campbell19	that	have	examined	the	
                                                
13	See,	for	example,	Samkin	and	Schneider,	“Accountability”.	
14	For	example,	Oliver,	“Strategic	Responses”;	Arroyo,	“Management	accounting	change”.	
15	Oliver,	“Strategic	Responses”.	
16	Modell,	Jacobs,	and	Wiesel,	“A	process	(re)turn?”,	455	
17	For	example,	Livesey,	“Eco-identity”;	Cornelissen,	Bekkum,	and	Ruler,	“Corporate	
communication”.	
18	Moerman	and	van	der	Laan,	“Pursuing	shareholder	value”;	Moerman	and	van	der	Laan,	
“Strategic	Bankruptcy”;	Moerman	and	van	der	Laan,	“Accounting	in	organizations”;	Moerman	
and	van	der	Laan,	Accounting	and	Long-tail	Liabilities.	
19	Moerman,	van	der	Laan,	and	Campbell,	“A	Tale”.	
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company	through	the	lens	of	strategic	bankruptcy	in	considering	how	accounting	
might	be	implicated	in	the	socialisation	of	risk	management.		
The	next	section	presents	a	historiographical	overview	of	the	James	Hardie	
Group.	A	description	of	the	sources	used	in	this	study	is	then	presented,	followed	
by	an	overview	of	Oliver’s	typology	of	strategic	responses	which	is	then	used	to	
categorise	and	analyse	the	actions	of	the	James	Hardie	Group	between	2001	and	
2007.	The	findings	are	then	presented	and	discussed	in	the	context	of	the	crisis	
management	and	crisis	communications	literature,	followed	by	use	of	Oliver’s	
framework	model	to	contextualise	analysis	of	the	motivation	behind	the	actions	
of	JH.	This	is	followed	by	some	concluding	observations	and	consideration	of	the	
limitations	of	this	study.		
2. The	James	Hardie	Group	
James	Hardie	Group	is	an	Australian	company	originally	founded	upon	importing	
oils	and	animal	hides	in	1888.	From	1915,	it	shifted	its	focus	of	operations	to	the	
mining	of	asbestos	and	the	manufacture	and	distribution	of	asbestos	products,	
including	sheeting	and	roofing	for	construction.	In	doing	so,	it	was	a	highly	
successful	company	and	an	iconic	Australian	building	supply	brand,	establishing	
asbestos	plants	in	five	of	the	six	Australian	states:	New	South	Wales,	South	
Australia,	Victoria,	Queensland,	and	Western	Australia.	It	was	the	75th	largest	
Australian	enterprise	in	196420	and	a	highly	respected	household	name	for	much	
of	the	20th	century.	Despite	the	harmful	physical	effects	of	asbestos	being	known	
since	the	early	decades	of	the	20th	century,	this	did	not	stop	the	company	
diversifying	into	and	then	expanding	this	lucrative	activity	during	a	period	of	
around	60	years.	
Its	public	persona	suggested	that	the	prospect	of	litigation	and	damages	
went	unrecognised	by	the	company	for	decades,	just	as	it	did	by	companies	
worldwide	who	were	involved	in	extraction,	production,	or	use	of	asbestos	
products.	However,	in	1978,	the	company	began	to	look	for	a	replacement	for	
asbestos	in	its	building	products.	It	was	recently	claimed	by	the	then	managing	
director,	David	Macfarlane,	that	it	did	so	for	commercial	reasons	–	asbestos	was	
becoming	too	expensive	–	rather	than	health	reasons.	According	to	Macfarlane,	
the	company	was	aware	that	“asbestos	was	in	bad	odour	around	the	world”	[in	
terms	of	media	exposure	of	health	concerns…	but,]	I	thought	the	risk	of	it	was	
overdone	...	a	media	beat-up”.21	However,	despite	Macfarlane’s	claims	that	the	
company	thought	it	was	all	a	bit	of	media	over-reaction,	that	same	year	it	took	a	
tangible	step	towards	protecting	itself	by	placing	asbestos	health	warnings	on	its	
packaging.22	This	did	not,	however,	deter	victims	from	seeking	compensation	
and	it	suffered	a	dramatic	fall	from	grace	when	miners	and	other	employees	
succeeded	in	linking	their	asbestos-related	illnesses	to	JH	in	the	1980s.	The	first	
judgement	against	the	company	came	in	198423	and,	in	1987,	it	ceased	all	its	
                                                
20	Ville	and	Merrett,	“The	Development”.	
21	Higgins,	“Hardie	boss”.	
22	Sexton	and	Stephens,	“Lives	in	the	Dust”.	
23	Asbestos	Diseases	Society	of	Australia,	Asbestos.	
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asbestos	manufacturing	activities,24	but	the	damage	had	already	been	done.	The	
1984	judgment	and	other	litigation	cases	brought	the	extent	of	the	company’s	
failure	to	safeguard	the	health	of	its	employees	into	the	open.	The	company	
rapidly	transformed	from	market	‘darling’	to	‘villain’	as	damaging	media	
coverage	sought	to	demonise	the	company’s	reaction	to	damages	claims	by	
victims,	particularly	after	it	lost	its	first	case	for	negligent	damages	in	1991.25	
Following	the	loss	of	that	case,	between	1995	and	1998	JH	went	through	
dramatic	structural,	legal,	and	organisational	change.	Most	of	the	assets	of	the	
original	operating	company	were	sold	to	other	companies	in	the	Group	and	the	
operating	assets	were	transferred	to	a	new	entity	domiciled	in	the	Netherlands.	
In	1999,	the	New	South	Wales	Dust	Diseases	Tribunal	ruled	that	James	Hardie	
had	known	of	the	dangers	to	health	from	asbestos	dust	since	1938	and,	in	2000,	
the	management	of	JH	began	considering	a	trust	structure	to	quarantine	the	
Group	from	its	potential	asbestos	liabilities.	A	series	of	discussions	were	held	
between	potential	directors	of	the	Trust	and	JH	management	between	December	
2000	and	January	2001	and,	in	February	2001,	the	Board	created	the	Medical	
Research	and	Compensation	Foundation	Ltd	(MRCF).	The	media	release	issued	at	
that	time	is	shown	in	Exhibit	1.	As	can	be	seen,	the	management	of	JH	expressed	
their	confidence	that	the	trust	had	sufficient	funds	to	cover	all	potential	asbestos	
claims.		
Exhibit	1:	James	Hardie	Media	Release	announcing	the	formation	of	the	Medical	
Research	and	Compensation	Foundation	(MRCF)	
16	February	2001	
James	Hardie	Resolves	its	Asbestos	Liability	Favourably	for	Claimants	and	Shareholders	
James	Hardie	Industries	Limited	(JHIL)	announced	today	that	it	had	established	a	foundation	to	
compensate	sufferers	of	asbestos-related	diseases	with	claims	against	two	former	James	Hardie	
subsidiaries	and	fund	medical	research	aimed	at	finding	cures	for	these	diseases.	The	Medical	
Research	and	Compensation	Foundation	(MRCF),	to	be	chaired	by	Sir	Llewellyn	Edwards,	will	be	
completely	independent	of	JHIL	and	will	commence	operation	with	assets	of	$293	million.	The	
Foundation	has	sufficient	funds	to	meet	all	legitimate	compensation	claims	anticipated	from	
people	injured	by	asbestos	products	that	were	manufactured	in	the	past	by	two	former	
subsidiaries	of	JHIL.	
JHIL	CEO	Mr	Peter	Macdonald	said	that	the	establishment	of	a	fully-funded	Foundation	provided	
certainty	for	both	claimants	and	shareholders.	“The	establishment	of	the	Medical	Research	and	
Compensation	Foundation	provides	certainty	for	people	with	a	legitimate	claim	against	the	
former	James	Hardie	companies	which	manufactured	asbestos	products,”	Mr	Macdonald	said.	
“The	Foundation	will	concentrate	on	managing	its	substantial	assets	for	the	benefit	of	claimants.	
Its	establishment	has	effectively	resolved	James	Hardie’s	asbestos	liability	and	this	will	allow	
management	to	focus	entirely	on	growing	the	company	for	the	benefit	of	all	shareholders.”…	In	
establishing	the	Foundation,	James	Hardie	sought	expert	advice	from	a	number	of	firms,	
including	PricewaterhouseCoopers,	Access	Economics	and	the	actuarial	firm,	Trowbridge.	With	
                                                
24	Haigh,	Asbestos	House.	
25	The	case	was	brought	on	behalf	of	an	employee	who	had	worked	for	six	months	during	1960	in	
JH’s	Brooklyn,	Victoria	factory,	where	it	had	started	production	of	asbestos	cement	building	
products	in	the	1920s	(Asbestos	Diseases	Society	of	Australia,	Asbestos;	Allens	Arthur	
Robinson,	“Submissions	of	James	Hardie”).	
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this	advice,	supplementing	the	company’s	long	experience	in	the	area	of	asbestos,	the	directors	of	
JHIL	determined	the	level	of	funding	required	by	the	Foundation.	“James	Hardie	is	satisfied	that	
the	Foundation	has	sufficient	funds	to	meet	anticipated	future	claims,”	Mr	Macdonald	said.	When	
all	future	claims	have	been	concluded,	surplus	funds	will	be	used	to	support	further	scientific	and	
medical	research	on	lung	diseases.	
The	fund,	however,	did	not	satisfy	the	company’s	critics	and	there	followed	a	
six-year	period	in	which	it	slowly	moved	its	position,	initially	when	it	was	
revealed	that	the	fund	was	significantly	underfunded,	more	so	when	a	public	
inquiry	revealed	that	the	company	had	been	aware	of	the	underfunding	from	the	
outset.	It	finally	agreed	a	level	of	support	for	victims	of	its	asbestos-related	
activities	that	satisfied	the	demands	of	its	key	stakeholders	in	February	2007.	It	
is	the	company’s	actions	within	this	six-year	period,	from	February	2001	to	
February	2007,	that	is	the	focus	of	this	study.	
3. Sources	of	information	
The	data	used	in	this	study	are	derived	from	analyses	of	the	company’s	
media	releases,	financial	statement	disclosures,	compensation	agreements,	and	
associated	documentation.	These	were	obtained	from	a	variety	of	sources,	
including	the	JH	website	(compensation	agreement	and	associated	
documentation);	Australian	Securities	Exchange	website	(JH	media	releases);	the	
Report	of	a	Special	Commission	in	2004	into	James	Hardie,	and	its	numerous	
submissions;	and	the	DatAnalysis	database	(financial	statement	disclosures).	In	
addition,	the	Business	Source	Premier	and	Factiva	databases	were	used	to	identify	
and	examine	press	reports	relating	to	JH	between	2001	and	2007.	
The	next	section	considers	the	nature	and	motivations	behind	the	actions	
taken	by	JH	during	this	period.		
4. The	Actions	of	the	James	Hardie	Group	2001-2007	
In	this	section,	in	order	to	categorise	its	actions	and	determine	how	the	
company’s	strategy	altered	over	the	period,	each	act	of	the	company	is	classified	
according	to	Oliver’s	framework	of	five	potential	strategies,	or	stages	of	
organisational	reaction	to	pressures	toward	conformity.26	Each	of	these	
strategies	represents	a	progressively	less	active	form	of	strategy	substitution	
intended	to	deal	with	given	institutional	requirements	and	expectations:	
avoidance,	defiance,	manipulation,	compromise,	and	acquiescence.		
4.1. Avoidance	
Oliver	describes	avoidance	as	an:	“attempt	to	preclude	the	necessity	of	
conformity…	by	concealing…	nonconformity	[i.e.	disguising	nonconformity	behind	a	
facade	of	acquiescence],	buffering	themselves	from	institutional	pressures,	or	
escaping	from	institutional	rules	or	expectations	[by	exiting	the	domain	within	
which	pressure	is	exerted].”27	JH	had	adopted	an	avoidance	strategy	in	1998	when	
it	attempted	to	‘escape’	by	relocating	the	domicile	of	its	operating	companies	
                                                
26	Oliver,	“Strategic	Responses”.	
27	Oliver,	“Strategic	Responses”,	154-155.	
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overseas,	a	move	that	was	subsequently	deemed	to	have	been	legally	valid	in	the	
courts.	However,	its	next	attempt	at	avoidance,	the	creation	of	the	MRCF,	was	a	
spectacular	failure.		
The	establishment	of	the	Foundation	gave	the	appearance	of	conformity,	but	
subsequent	events	revealed	it	to	have	been	more	of	a	smokescreen	intended	to	
deflect	attention,	avoidance	not	compromise,	nor	acquiescence.	It	began	to	
unravel	in	October	2003	when	JH	found	it	could	no	longer	conceal	that	the	
Foundation	was	inadequately	resourced.	The	management	of	JH	reacted	by	
actively	seeking	to	escape	from	the	situation	it	was	in	through	transferring	much	
of	the	liability	for	asbestos	claims	onto	the	wider	community.	Firstly,	the	MRCF	
publicly	conceded	that	there	were	likely	to	be	insufficient	funds	within	the	
Foundation	to	meet	future	potential	claims28	and	CEO	Macdonald	issued	a	
statement	indicating	that	any	such	shortfall	was	“a	community-wide	problem	that	
is	much	larger	than	the	Foundation’s	liabilities”.29	At	the	same	time,	one	of	the	JH	
companies,	Amaca,30	was	in	the	High	Court	arguing	that	the	New	South	Wales	
State	Government	was	partially	liable	for	any	asbestos	claims	because	it	had	
known	about	the	possible	health	risks	relating	to	asbestos	yet	had	continued	to	
utilise	asbestos	as	a	building	material	in	the	provision	of	public	housing.31	
Meanwhile,	the	company	endeavoured	to	shift	the	blame	for	any	errors	in	
the	funding	calculations	onto	external	consultants.	In	a	media	release	of	29	
October	2003,	CEO	Macdonald	sought	to	avoid	JH	being	held	responsible	for	the	
under-resourcing	of	the	Foundation:	“over	10	years	experience	and	eight	years	of	
actuarial	reports	were	used”	to	arrive	at	the	figure	representing	the	level	of	
funding	needed	to	establish	the	Foundation.	“It	is	difficult	if	not	impossible	for	us	
to	understand	how	things	could	have	changed	so	dramatically	in	just	under	3	
years.”	However,	during	the	Special	Commission	of	Inquiry,	this	was	found	to	
have	been	far	from	the	truth.	The	actuarial	analyses	provided	to	JH	when	it	
created	the	MRCF	in	2001	were	not	comprehensive	enough	to	reliably	ascertain	
the	amount	required	to	fund	the	Foundation,32	nor	were	the	assumptions	used	in	
arriving	at	the	figures	used	in	the	calculations	of	the	amount	required	
independently	checked,	despite	PWC	having	been	retained	apparently	for	that	
purpose.33		
In	November	2003,	CEO	Macdonald	vehemently	denied	that	the	company	
was	trying	to	avoid	its	asbestos-related	liabilities	when	it	established	MRCF:	
“[the	establishment	of	the	Foundation	was	a]	fair,	transparent	and	legitimate	
action	to	provide	certainty	for	claimants	and	shareholders”.34	He	continued	to	do	
so	in	April	2004,	shifting	blame	towards	the	management	of	MRCF	management	
                                                
28	Merritt	and	Priest,	“Dust-up”.	
29	James	Hardie,	“Possible	Asbestos	Funding	Shortfall”.	
30	In	2001,	Amaca	Pty.	Ltd.	was	adopted	as	the	new	name	of	the	entity,	James	Hardie	and	Coy	Pty.	
Ltd.	This	was	the	former	operating	entity	of	the	Group	during	its	asbestos	manufacturing	era	
and	a	subsidiary	of	the	listed	company,	James	Hardie	Industries	Ltd.	The	MRCF	held	50%	of	the	
shares	in	this	entity	with	balance	held	by	MRCF	Investments	Pty.	Ltd.		
31	Priest,	“NSW	Government”.	
32	Special	Commission	of	Inquiry,	Witness	Transcript	Reference	3261-3282.	
33	Special	Commission	of	Inquiry,	Report,	57.	
34	MacDonald,	“Asbestos	Compensation	Fund	Assertions”,	67.	
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for	the	huge	increase	in	these	liabilities	in	the	three	years	since	the	Foundation	
was	established.35	However,	he	retreated	from	this	position	when,	under	cross-
examination	before	the	Special	Commission	of	Inquiry	in	June	2004,	he	agreed	
that	the	company	received	no	outside	expert	financial	advice	on	whether	the	
MRCF	would	have	sufficient	funds	to	meet	future	claims.36	It	was	not	surprising	
that	when	reporting	the	Inquiry’s	findings,	Commissioner	Jackson	QC	described	
the	media	release	reproduced	in	Exhibit	One	as	“a	pure	public	relations	construct,	
bereft	of	substance”.37		
These	were	by	no	means	the	only	instances	of	avoidance	strategy	adopted	by	
JH	during	this	period.	The	2001	Annual	Report	was	issued	a	year	before	the	
public	outcry	associated	with	the	revelation	that	the	MRCF	was	significantly	
under-resourced.	Asbestos-related	liabilities	are	mentioned	only	once,	in	a	note	
to	the	accounts	in	which	the	company	distances	itself	from	the	issues	completely	
and	concludes	that:	“James	Hardie	does	not	currently	anticipate	that	the	effect	of	
such	laws,	regulations,	ordinances	or	claims	will	have	a	material	adverse	effect	on	
its	business,	financial	condition	or	results	of	operations”.38	Corporate	disclosures	
can	be	a	potentially	significant	tool	in	managing	legitimacy39	and	in	that	annual	
report	there	is	no	mention	of	asbestos	in	the	directors’	review	of	operations,	an	
astonishing	omission	given	the	situation	that	the	company	knew	it	was	in,	but	it	
was	consistent	with	a	company	that	wished	to	avoid	any	discussion	or	focus	
upon	the	asbestos	problem.		
Thus,	knowing	that	the	MRCF	was	under-funded	from	the	start,	JH	used	a	
series	of	corporate	disclosures	in	an	effort	to	distance	itself	by	deflecting	
attention	while	endeavouring	to	conceal	the	company’s	nonconformity	with	
institutional	expectations40	and	so	avoid	future	obligations	for	the	under-funding	
of	the	Foundation.	
4.2. 	Defiance	
While	avoidance	is	concerned	with	an	entity	distancing	itself	from	the	issues,	
defiance	is	a	more	active	form	of	resistance	to	institutional	pressures	whereby	
the	threatened	entity	begins	to	‘fight	back’.	In	a	situation	where	enforcement	of	
rules	is	perceived	as	poor,	the	organisation	may	seek	to	dismiss,	or	ignore,	the	
rules	or	values	altogether.	Oliver	proposes	three	tactics	of	defiance.	In	order	of	
escalating	resistance:	dismissal,	challenge,	and	attack,41	all	of	which	were	
employed	by	JH,	particularly	towards	the	end	of	the	Special	Inquiry	in	2004	and	
during	2005	and	2006.		
                                                
35	Macdonald,	“James	Hardie	Will	Rebut”.	
36	Special	Commission	of	Inquiry,	Witness	Transcript	Reference	2280-2664.	
37	Special	Commission	of	Inquiry,	Report,	358.	
38	James	Hardie,	2001	Annual	Report,	30.	
39	Merkl-Davies	and	Brennan,	“Discretionary	Disclosure	Strategies”.	
40	While	the	needs	and	expectations	of	diverse	stakeholders	such	as	the	unions	and	shareholders	
may	vary	on	matters	such	as	wages	and	conditions	of	employment,	it	became	clear	that	as	the	
JH	saga	developed	there	was	increasing	agreement	amongst	most,	if	not	all,	of	these	groups	that	
JH’s	efforts	to	quarantine	itself	from	the	asbestos	legacy	were	unacceptable	and	needed	to	
change.	It	follows	that	the	institutional	expectations	were	highly	aligned	on	this	key	issue.		
41	Oliver,	“Strategic	Responses”,	156.	
  
 
10 
Dismissal:	some	examples	of	this	tactic	were	already	mentioned	in	the	previous	
section,	including	the	claim	in	its	2001	Annual	Report	that	it	did	not	face	any	
material	threats	and	dismissal	of	any	suggestion	that	any	legal	liability	existed.	In	
another	instance	of	this	approach,	to	counter	a	barrage	of	negative	publicity	
concerning	the	MRCF,	CEO	Macdonald	used	a	newspaper	interview	in	March	
2004	to	state	that	the	company	had	done	“nothing	that	it	wouldn’t	do	again	in	the	
same	circumstances”,42	effectively	dismissing	any	criticism	by	implying	that	JH	
had	done	what	anyone	else	would	have	done.	Two	weeks	later,	he	reinforced	his	
position,	dismissing	media	coverage,	alleging	that	it	was	biased	against	the	
company.43		
Challenge:	Following	publication	of	the	Inquiry’s	highly	critical	findings	in	
September	2004,	JH	faced	mounting	political	pressure	to	unconditionally	fund	all	
claims.	It	responded	by	reverting	to	a	similar	tactic	to	the	one	it	had	embraced	in	
2003,	when	it	had	confronted	the	New	South	Wales	Government	in	the	High	
Court.	This	time,	it	used	a	media	release	to	challenge	the	Government	to	establish	
a	statutory	compensation	fund	for	asbestos	victims.44		
Attack:	Oliver	noted	that	attacking	actions	seek	to	“assault,	belittle,	or	vehemently	
denounce	institutionalized	values	and	the	external	constituents	that	express	
them.”45	In	testimony	to	the	Inquiry,	the	chairman	of	the	MRCF	accused	JH	of	not	
providing	sufficiently	timely	data	for	the	Foundation	to	detect	that	it	was	
underfunded	and	implied	that	it	had	been	misled	into	assuming	that	the	data	
supplied	was	the	latest	available.46	JH	denounced	the	claims	and	adopted	
‘assault’	tactics,	threatening	to	sue	the	Foundation	if	it	sought	to	take	legal	action	
against	the	company.47	
Related	to	the	theme	of	defiance,	the	literature	on	defensive	impression	
management	techniques48	suggests	that	denial	and	justification	are	common	
strategies	employed	by	organisations	under	siege.	For	example,	Suchman	
discussed	the	tactic	of	formulating	a	normalising	account.	49	He	contended	that	
this	approach,	which	is	the	one	adopted	by	JH	when	it	established	the	MRCF,	
seeks	to	separate	the	threatening	revelation	from	larger	assessments	of	the	
organisation	as	a	whole.	He	argued	that	by	retrospectively	redefining	means	and	
ends,	an	organisation	can	seek	to	make	an	action	seem	morally	acceptable.	
However,	such	tactics	are	not	likely	to	succeed	unless	they	are	seen	to	be	sincere	
and	valid	and,	by	their	very	nature,	may	be	counterproductive	to	perceived	
legitimacy	of	an	entity	if	later	developments	contradict	their	substance.50	In	the	
case	of	JH,	this	is	what	occurred.	Revelations	about	the	known	inadequacy	of	the	
funds	set	aside	for	claimants	undermined	JH’s	credibility,	cast	major	doubts	upon	
                                                
42	Merritt,	“Nothing	to	be	ashamed”.	
43	Macdonald,	“James	Hardie	Will	Rebut”.	
44		James	Hardie,	“Regarding	Special	Commission	Report”.	
45	Oliver,	“Strategic	Responses”,	157.	
46	Special	Commission	of	Inquiry,	Witness	Transcript	Reference	79-190.	
47	Special	Commission	of	Inquiry,	Exhibits	13-15.	
48	See,	for	example,	Suchman,	“Managing	legitimacy”;	Ogden	and	Clarke,	“Customer	disclosures”.	
49	Suchman,	“Managing	legitimacy”,	598.	
50	Ogden	and	Clarke,	“Customer	disclosures”.	
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the	ethical	integrity	of	its	management	and	the	validity	of	its	other	disclosures,	
and	further	diminished	it	reputational	capital.		
4.3. Manipulation		
Oliver	defined	manipulation	as	the	“purposeful	and	opportunistic	attempt	to	co-
opt,	influence,	or	control	institutional	pressures	and	evaluations”.51		Throughout	
the	period	of	this	study,	while	concurrently	adopting	other	strategies	that	varied	
according	to	the	extent	to	which	the	situation	facing	the	company	altered,	JH	
engaged	in	a	continuous	effort	to	manipulate	politicians	and	the	political	process,	
and	to	influence	the	timing	and	tone	of	media	reporting.	An	example	of	the	latter	
can	be	found	in	an	internal	Board	paper	that	recommended	that	the	formation	of	
the	MRCF	(that	had	occurred	some	months	earlier)	be	announced	
simultaneously	with	the	quarterly	financial	results	for	2001,	rather	than	as	a	
separate	media	event	because	this	would	minimise	the	risk	that	“non-business	
media	and	perhaps	other	stakeholders	would	attend	and	hijack	the	briefing…	this	
will	enable	us	to	announce	the	separation	in	a	pure	business	context	and	set	the	
agenda	for	public	debate	in	this	context”.52	When	publicly	restated	by	CEO	
Macdonald	during	the	Inquiry,	there	was	no	specific	mention	of	the	media.	
Instead,	he	simply	stated	that	JH	did	not	publicly	announce	the	formation	of	the	
MRCF	until	several	months	after	it	had	occurred	because	it	sought	to	avoid	the	
risk	of	opposition	from	unions,	government	and	other	stakeholders	seeking	to	make	
the	group.53	
Concerning	manipulation	of	politicians	and	the	political	process,	JH	paid	
former	Federal	Senator,	Stephen	Loosley,	to	act	as	a	lobbyist	on	its	behalf	so	as	to	
utilise	his	political	connections	to	introduce	JH	executives	to	key	New	South	
Wales	government	advisors.	Moreover,	he	was	to	receive	a	contingency	fee	if	JH’s	
separation	from	its	asbestos	liabilities	proceeded	without	legal	opposition.54		
CEO	Macdonald’s	use	of	interviews	to	manipulate	opinion	have	been	
described	earlier	in	this	paper	and	one	of	the	clearest	indications	of	JH’s	
adoption	of	a	manipulation	strategy	can	be	seen	very	early	in	the	press	releases	it	
made	during	the	period	when	the	MRCF	was	being	formed	and	then	promoted.	In	
particular,	the	press	release	issued	in	February	2001	announcing	the	formation	
of	the	MRCF	utilised	language	and	phrases,	such	as:	‘substantial	assets’,	‘sought	
expert	advice’	and	‘provided	certainty	for	both	claimants	and	shareholders’,	all	of	
which	appear	designed	to	provide	reassurance	to	stakeholders	but,	as	indicated	
earlier,	they	were	for	the	most	part	a	fabrication.		
Finally,	previous	studies55	have	found	a	positive	association	between	
disclosure	levels	and	adverse	media	attention.	As	previously	mentioned,	there	
had	been	no	disclosures	at	all	about	its	asbestos	liability	in	the	2001	Annual	
Report.	In	response	to	growing	amounts	of	public	disquiet,	four	years	later	the	
                                                
51	Oliver,	“Strategic	Responses”,	154.	
52	Priest,	“James	Hardie's	secret	plan”.	
53	Special	Commission	of	Inquiry,	Witness	Transcript	Reference	2280-2664.	
54	Special	Commission	of	Inquiry,	Witness	Transcript	Reference	2095-2116.	
55	See,	for	example,	Brown	and	Deegan,	“Public	disclosure”.	
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2005	Annual	Report	included	eight	pages	on	asbestos-related	issues.	This	
included	extensive	analysis	of	potential	claims	including	an	actuarial	study;	and,	
an	update	on	the	Heads	of	Agreement	entered	into	with	the	New	South	Wales	
State	Government,	all	presented	in	a	way	that	presented	a	positive	impression	
about	the	company	and	the	situation	it	faced.	Consistent	with	the	impression	
management	literature,56	the	company	also	adopted	a	positive	stance	in	its	
comments	on	the	findings	of	the	Inquiry.	Coverage	of	asbestos-related	issues	
increased	to	ten	pages	in	the	2006	Annual	Report,	with	227	mentions	of	
asbestos,	along	with	the	inclusion	of	the	statement	that	“[the	company]	intends	to	
proceed	with	fair	and	equitable	actions	to	compensate	the	injured	parties”;57	and	
this	high	level	and	tone	of	disclosures	continued	in	the	2007	Annual	Report.	
However,	in	the	2006	Annual	Report	JH	attempted	to	manipulate	opinion	by	
refusing	to	accept	any	responsibility	for	its	involvement	in	asbestos,	dismissing	
anything	negative	as	being	attributable	to	previous	management,	a	recognised	
tactic	in	the	crisis	response	literature.58	Remarkably,	it	did	so	despite	the	fact	
that	the	then	Chairman,	Meredith	Hellicar,	had	been	a	Board	member	since	1992.		
4.4. Compromise		
In	September	2004,	the	Commission	concluded	that	CEO	Macdonald	had	
breached	his	duty	as	a	director,	that	there	was	evidence	he	issued	false	and	
misleading	statements	to	the	Australian	Securities	Exchange,	and	that	he	was	not	
a	credible	witness.59	The	company	management	was	ridiculed	and	the	company	
was	under	siege,	publically	admonished	by	politicians,	union	leaders,	and	media	
commentators;	and	calls	were	being	made	for	removal	of	its	CEO	and	other	
senior	officers.	As	noted	by	Priest,	“mounting	boycotts	of	its	products,	possible	
fraud	charges	against	senior	executives,	blanket	media	coverage	and	the	return	of	
political	donations	meant	the	company	brand	was	suffering	heavy	damage.”60		
The	company’s	response	to	these	increasing	institutional	pressures	
represented	a	clear	change	in	strategy.	Avoidance	and	defiance	gave	way	to	
attempts	to	pacify,	to	demonstrate	contrition,	and	promises	to	seek	a	more	
equitable	solution,	all	led	by	a	shift	in	stance	in	its	communications	towards	
being	more	balanced	and	more	willing	to	listen	and	respond.	In	an	attempt	to	
pacify	its	critics,	it	invoked	a	change	of	leadership,	but	not	with	an	outsider,	and	
no	changes	were	made	to	the	appointments	of	CEO	Macdonald	or	any	other	
senior	members	of	the	Board.	This	astonishing	lack	of	recognition	of	the	extent	
to	which	the	public	image	of	its	management	had	been	destroyed	by	the	findings	
of	the	Inquiry	was,	perhaps,	unsurprising	given	the	ability	the	company	had	
exhibited	in	managing	to	ignore	the	obvious	in	the	face	of	overwhelming	
evidence,	but	at	least	some	changes	had	been	made.	The	compromising	had	
begun.	
                                                
56	For	example,	Neu,	Warsame,	and	Pedwell,	“Managing	public	impressions”;	Ogden	and	Clarke,	
“Customer	disclosures”.	
57	James	Hardie,	2006	Annual	Report,	105.	
58	Coombs,	“Conceptualizing	crisis	communication”.	
59	Special	Commission	of	Inquiry,	Report,	366.	
60	Priest,	“Hardie	backdown”,	6.	
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On	11	August,	2004,	Meredith	Hellicar,	was	announced	as	the	new	Chairman	
of	the	Joint	Board	and	Supervisory	Board,61	replacing	Alan	McGregor	who	was	
undergoing	treatment	for	lymphoma.	Hellicar	immediately	became	the	highly	
visible	media	voice	of	James	Hardie,	adopting	a	very	contrite	tone	in	her	public	
pronouncements	and	making	the	outcry	concerning	the	MRCF	her	first	target.	
Apologies	for	past	actions	would	be	expected	as	a	response	to	public	pressures	
arising	from	adverse	environmental	press62	and	less	than	a	week	after	becoming	
Chairman,	on	16	August	Hellicar	apologized	to	claimants	for	the	‘manifest	under-
funding’	of	the	MRCF	and	stated	that	the	Board	was	‘totally	committed’	to	
ensuring	proper	compensation	for	all	victims.	Whereas	formerly	the	focus	had	
been	on	‘legal	obligations’,	for	the	first	time	JH	began	to	talk	about	‘moral	
obligations’63	and	‘moral	responsibility’	and	of	how	the	Board	of	JH	wanted	to	
increase	funding	to	the	MRCF	because,	as	stated	by	Hellicar,	it	was	“what	we	
morally	want	to	do”.64	In	the	following	month,	Hellicar	continued	to	present	this	
conciliatory	tone:		
Speaking	about	the	under-funded	MRCF	on	17	August	2004,	she	again	
apologised:	“I	can	do	no	more	than	say	sorry.	At	the	end	of	the	day,	it	was	
underfunded.”65	
“I	think	hindsight	would	say	that	there	are	a	lot	of	lessons	learnt.”66	
	“…	there’s	absolutely	no	doubt	that	the	foundation	was	significantly	
underfunded	and	the	board	takes	responsibility	for	that	…	frankly,	we	are	
all	up	for	re-examination	and	I	don’t	exclude	myself	from	this.”67		
“I	agree	I	think	we	did	misjudge	the	public	attention	that	would	be	brought	
upon	us	…	we	have	been	caught	in	a	storm	of	publicity	…	it	is	going	to	take	
us	a	long	time	to	restore	our	credibility	and	reputation.”68	
Meanwhile,	on	13	August,	two	days	after	the	announcement	of	Hellicar’s	
appointment,	and	also	the	final	day	of	the	Inquiry	Hearings,	the	company’s	
barrister	announced	that	it	had	agreed	to	open-ended	compensation	for	all	
future	victims	of	its	products,	subject	to	new	legislation	capping	legal	costs	and	
without	admitting	legal	liability.	Although	extremely	limited	and	ignorant	of	
present	claimants,	this	change	in	attitude	was	acknowledged	by	the	Australian	
Council	of	Trade	Unions	(ACTU)	that,	until	then,	had	been	an	ardent	critic	of	the	
company’s	tactics	and	had	led	the	boycott	of	its	products.	The	then	ACTU	
secretary,	while	questioning	the	details,	called	the	move	a	‘real	breakthrough’	as	
JH	now	“accepted	their	obligation	to	compensate	all	victims”.69	
                                                
61	James	Hardie,	“New	Chairman	appointed”.	
62	O’Donovan,	“Managing	legitimacy”.	
63	ABC,	“TV	Program	Transcript”.	
64	Buffini	and	Pretty,	“Hardie's	new	tactic”.	
65	ABC,	“TV	Program	Transcript”.	
66	Buffoni,	“Hellicar	vows”.	
67	Buffini	and	Stafford,	“New	Hardie	offer”.	
68	Buffini	and	Stafford,	“New	Hardie	offer”.	
69	Combet,	“James	Hardie	Media	Conference”.	
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The	company’s	initial	attempt	to	resist	calls	for	its	senior	executives	to	
resign	by	installing	Helliar	as	the	Chairman	had	not	had	the	impact	it	had	hoped.	
A	further	attempt	at	placating	its	critics	came	seven	weeks	later,	on	September	
28,	2004,	when	JH	announced	that	its	CEO	and	its	CFO	had	both	been	deposed	
although,	in	the	spirit	of	compromise,	ex-CEO	Macdonald	retained	his	pay	and	an	
ongoing	“responsibility	for	business	operations”.70		
JH	was	also	engaged	in	negotiations	with	key	stakeholders,	attempting	to	
strike	a	bargain	that	would	satisfy	their	demands.	On	December	21,	2004	it	
announced	that	it	had	entered	into	a	voluntary	agreement	negotiated	with	key	
stakeholders	including	asbestos	sufferers,	the	ACTU,	and	the	New	South	Wales	
Government,	“which	is	expected	to	form	the	basis	of	a	proposed	binding	agreement	
(the	"Principal	Agreement")	to	establish	and	fund	a	special	purpose	fund	(the	
"SPF")	to	provide	funding	on	a	long-term	basis	for	asbestos-related	injury	and	
death	claims	(the	"Claims")	against	Amaca,	Amaba,	and	ABN	6071	…”.72	A	year	
later,	on	1	December	1,	2005,	it	entered	into	a	conditional	agreement	with	the	
New	South	Wales	Government.	This	was	then	amended	on	21	November	2006.	
The	company	asked	its	shareholders	to	ratify	the	agreement	on	12	December	
2006,	justifying	its	position	in	an	Explanatory	Memorandum:	
“…	the	contribution	of	funding	on	a	voluntary	basis	in	response	to	such	a	
shortfall	is	consistent	with	investor	and	Australian	community	expectations;	and	
James	Hardie	is	at	risk	of	having	potential	adverse	action	taken	against	it	by	
governments,	unions	and	consumers	if	it	does	not	provide	a	response	to	the	
estimated	future	funding	shortfall	which	is	acceptable	to	the	NSW	Government,	the	
Australian	Government,	the	ACTU,	Unions	NSW	and	Asbestos	Diseases	Groups.	
While	it	is	not	possible	to	predict	the	precise	nature	or	impact	of	such	actions,	it	is	
possible	that	these	actions	could,	individually	or	cumulatively,	have	a	significant	
adverse	effect	upon	James	Hardie’s	profitability,	results	of	operation	and	
reputation,	particularly	with	respect	to	its	Australian	based	operations.”73	
However,	it	prefaced	this	statement	by	once	again	asserting	that,	from	a	legal	
perspective,	it	had	no	cause	to	do	so:	“James	Hardie	believes	that	under	current	
law	James	Hardie	has	no	present	legal	liability	to	meet	the	liabilities	of	the	Former	
James	Hardie	Companies,	except	to	the	limited	extent	previously	agreed	to	by	James	
Hardie”.74		
A	voluntarily	agreement	had	been	reached	by	the	company	with	its	key	
stakeholders	that	was	justified	by	JH	on	moral	and	business	grounds	and,	as	
revealed	elsewhere	in	the	memorandum,	JH	was	confident	that	the	benefits	of	
agreeing	to	paying	compensation	outweighed	the	costs	of	doing	so.	It	had	not	
                                                
70	Buffini	and	Stafford,	“New	Hardie	offer”.	
71	ABN	60	was	formerly	known	as	James	Hardie	Industries	Ltd.	Amaca	was	known	as	James	
Hardie	and	Coy	Pty.	Ltd..	Amaba	Pty.	Ltd.	was	known	as	Jsekarb	Pty.	Ltd..	The	names	of	these	
three	entities	were	all	changed	in	February	2001.	Together	these	entities	housed	the	asbestos	
obligations	of	the	Group.		
72	James	Hardie,	2005	Annual	Report,	F-26.	
73	James	Hardie,	Explanatory	Memorandum,	2.	
74	James	Hardie,	Explanatory	Memorandum,	2.	
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capitulated,	nor	acquiesced.	Rather,	it	had	compromised:	pacifying	and	bargaining	
in	an	attempt	to	balance	the	internal	interests	of	the	company	with	those	of	
multiple	stakeholders.	Oliver	suggests	that	compromise	is	done	in	a	“spirit	of	
conforming	to	and	accommodating	institutional	rules,	norms,	or	values”75	and	
these	are	acknowledged	in	the	Explanatory	Memorandum.	However,	as	revealed	
in	that	document,	the	company	was	still	negotiating	tax	breaks	for	its	
compensation	payments,	still	denying	liability,	and	only	going	so	far	as	it	felt	it	
had	to	in	terms	of	cost	and	benefits	to	the	company,	all	of	which	is	in	line	with	
Oliver’s	view	that	“institutional	compliance	is	only	partial	and	organizations	are	
more	active	in	promoting	their	own	interests”.76	The	shareholders	approved	the	
recommendations	in	February	2007.	
4.5. Overall	
At	no	stage	did	the	company	acquiesce,	admit	it	was	responsible	for	the	results	of	
its	actions,	and	accept	that	it	had	to	make	full	restitution	for	what	had	occurred.	
By	adopting	these	tactics,	the	company	secured	its	survival,	but	those	involved	in	
the	subterfuge	did	not	escape	unpunished.	In	2009,	former	CEO	Macdonald,	who	
had	received	AU$8.8	million	from	JH	when	he	resigned	in	2004,	was	fined	
AU$350,000	and	given	a	15-year	ban	from	serving	as	a	company	director.	The	
company’s	former	General	Council	was	fined	AU$79,000	and	given	a	7	year	ban;	
and	the	former	CFO	was	fined	AU$35,000	and	a	5-year	ban.	Seven	other	senior	
executives,	including	former	Chairman	Hellicar,77	were	also	found	guilty	of	
breaching	their	duties	to	the	company	in	2001	over	the	MRCF	media	release.	
They	appealed,	but	the	verdicts	and	punishments	were	upheld	in	the	High	Court	
in	2012,	with	former	Chairman	Hellicar	and	the	six	other	former	Board	members	
each	fined	AU$30,000	and	given	a	5-year	ban.	
The	actions	of	JH	can	also	be	interpreted	by	reference	to	its	crisis	
management	and	crisis	response	communications.	
5. Crisis	Management	and	Crisis	Response	Communications		
5.1. Crisis	Management		
Crisis	management	emphasises	the	value	of	reputations.78	Organizations	
accumulate	reputational	capital	over	time,	as	JH	did	at	least	until	the	1970s,	and	
arguably	for	some	time	thereafter.	It	became	a	household	name,	well-respected,	
an	exemplar	of	excellent	business	practices.	If	an	event	is	considered	to	be	
‘offensive’,	such	as	the	impact	of	JH’s	use	of	asbestos	on	people’s	health,	it	can	
become	a	crisis,79	as	can	a	seemingly	harmless	event	that	is	not	handled	
appropriately.80	According	to	De	Maria,	a	post-scandalised	organisation,	such	as	
JH,	has	three	choices:	become	a	redemptive	organisation;	tread	water;	or	slip	
                                                
75	Oliver,	“Strategic	Responses”,	154.	
76	Oliver,	“Strategic	Responses”,	154.	
77	Hellicar	had	resigned	as	Chairman	in	2007.	
78	Coombes,	“Protecting	organization	reputations”.	
79	Benoit,	Accounts,	Excuses,	and	Apologies.	
80	Coombes,	“Protecting	organization	reputations”.	
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into	becoming	a	rogue	organisation.81	JH’s	response	to	a	growing	sense	of	
outrage	in	the	late	1990s	was	to	tread	water,	to	maintain	a	policy	of	denial,	to	
refuse	to	settle	any	claim	for	compensation,	and	to	distance	itself	from	liability	
by	restructuring	the	organisation,	relocating	its	operations	overseas,	and	
forming	the	MRFC.	When	the	underfunding	of	the	Trust	became	public	
knowledge,	JH’s	loss	of	reputational	capital	was	complete.	It	had	become	a	public	
disgrace,	a	company	in	crisis	and	immersed	in	scandal.	Its	management	had	been	
shown	to	be	deceitful	and	manipulative	and	unable	to	be	trusted.	To	secure	its	
survival,	an	organisation	in	crisis	must	be	perceived	to	be	ready	to	move	to	a	
post-crisis	phase	of	rebuilding	its	standing	showing	a	level	of	remorse	that	is	
sufficiently	effective	for	stakeholders	to	believe	that	it	has	absorbed	the	lessons	
from	its	mistakes.82	This	is	what	JH	then	endeavoured	to	do	by	entering	into	the	
negotiations	that	led	to	the	Amended	and	Final	Funding	Agreement	in	2007.		
5.2. Crisis	Communications	
Pre-crisis,	organisations	engage	in	prevention	and	planning	communication	
activities,	but	once	a	crisis	occurs,	a	different	form	of	communication	must	be	
adopted:	response.	“The	central	goals	of	crisis	response	communication	reflect	
those	of	crisis	management:(1)	preventing	or	minimizing	damage,(2)	maintaining	
the	organization's	operations	(business	continuity),	and	(3)	reputation	repair”.83	
Generally,	the	media	frames	the	crisis	and	this	is	what	most	stakeholders	will	
encounter	and	accept,	which	is	why	it	is	imperative	that	the	organisation	ensures	
that	it	uses	the	media	to	present	its	version	of	events	and	to	firmly	state	its	
position.	Borrowing	from	the	impression	management	literature	and,	in	
particular	Allen	and	Callouet,84	Coombs	presents	a	range	of	fundamental	
organisational	crisis	response	communication	strategies,	including	attacking	the	
accuser;	asserting	that	there	is	no	crisis;	blaming	some	person	or	group	outside	
of	the	organization	for	the	crisis;	compensating	victims	through	offers	of	money	
or	other	gifts;	and,	apologising	and	stating	that	the	organization	takes	full	
responsibility	for	the	crisis.85	As	shown	in	this	study,	JH	adopted	all	these	crisis	
response	communication	tactics,	but	waited	until	all	other	tactics	had	failed	
before	apologising.	It	never	admitted	full	responsibility.		
Overall,	JH’s	crisis	management	tactics	combined	with	its	crisis	response	
communication	strategy	were	successful	in	slowing	the	wave	of	antagonism	and	
outrage	it	faced	and,	while	its	reputation	was	left	in	pieces,	it	salvaged	sufficient	
of	it	to	be	able	to	continue	in	business	where	other	businesses	elsewhere	did	not.	
But,	what	was	it	that	drove	JH	to	delay	so	long,	to	wait	until	it	was	facing	
complete	destruction	before	acting	to	restore	trust	and	public	sentiment	through	
apology	and	compromise?	This	is	explored	in	the	next	section.	
                                                
81	De	Maria,	“After	the	scandal”.	
82	Benoit,	Accounts,	Excuses,	and	Apologies;	Coombs,	“Protecting	organization	reputations”;	De	
Maria,	“After	the	scandal”;	Grebe,	“Things	can	get	worse”.	
83	Coombs,	“Conceptualizing	crisis	communication”,	105.	
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6. What	factors	motivated	the	actions	taken	by	James	Hardie?	
In	addition	to	defining	the	five	forms	of	organisational	reaction	to	pressures	
toward	conformity	utilised	in	this	study,	Oliver	also	proposed	that	these	could	be	
applied	in	a	predictive	model	that	indicates	the	likelihood	of	organisational	
resistance	based	on	boundaries	relating	to	the	willingness	and	ability	of	
organisations	to	conform	and	the	costs	and	benefits,	including	affects	on	
legitimacy,	of	doing	so.86	Oliver’s	model	is	founded	upon	the	similarities	and	
differences	between	the	predicted	response	of	an	organisation	to	institutional	
pressures	as	indicated	by	institutional	theory	compared	with	those	indicated	by	
resource-based	theories	of	organisational	behaviour.	It	contains	10	predictive	
dimensions,	five	of	which	–	1,	2,	3,	6,	and	9	–	are	most	likely	to	exhibit	the	
greatest	extreme	directional	relationship	between	the	causal	factor	and	choice	of	
a	resistance-focused	strategy	–	avoidance,	defiance,	or	manipulation	–	rather	
than	compromise	or	acquiescence:87	
1:	The	lower	the	degree	of	social	legitimacy	perceived	to	be	attainable	from	
conformity	to	institutional	pressures,	the	greater	the	likelihood	of	
organisational	resistance	to	institutional	pressures.88	
2:		The	lower	the	degree	of	economic	gain	perceived	to	be	attainable	from	
conformity	to	institutional	pressures,	the	greater	the	likelihood	of	
organizational	resistance	to	institutional	pressures.89	
3:	The	greater	the	degree	of	constituent	multiplicity	(i.e.	multiple,	conflicting,	
constituent	expectations	exerted	on	an	organization),	the	greater	the	
likelihood	of	organizational	resistance	to	institutional	pressures.90	
6:	The	greater	the	degree	of	discretionary	constraints	(i.e.	greater	the	loss	of	
decision-making	discretion)	imposed	upon	the	organization	by	institutional	
pressures,	the	greater	the	likelihood	of	organizational	resistance	to	
institutional	pressures.91	
9:	The	lower	the	level	of	uncertainty	in	the	organization’s	environment	(i.e.	the	
degree	to	which	future	states	of	the	world	cannot	be	anticipated	and	
accurately	predicted),	the	greater	the	likelihood	of	organizational	
resistance	to	institutional	pressures.92	
In	the	case	of	JH,	it	can	be	seen	that	a	pivotal	instance	occurred	at	the	
conclusion	of	the	Special	Commission	of	Inquiry.	The	company’s	failure	to	
compromise	up	to	that	point	and	its	switch	to	a	compromise	strategy	thereafter	
can	be	explained,	at	least	in	part,	using	these	five	dimensions.	Firstly,	its	
reputational	capital,	its	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	its	stakeholders,	could	not	have	
                                                
86	Oliver,	“Strategic	Responses”.	
87	Oliver,	“Strategic	Responses”,	159-172.	
88	Oliver,	“Strategic	Responses”,	160.	
89	Oliver,	“Strategic	Responses”,	160-161.	
90	Oliver,	“Strategic	Responses”,	162.	
91	Oliver,	“Strategic	Responses”,	164.	
92		Oliver,	“Strategic	Responses”,	170.	
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been	lower	in	the	periods	before	and	after	its	adoption	of	a	compromise	strategy.	
After	over	70	years	involvement	in	asbestos,	during	at	least	50	of	which	it	had	
known	of	the	dangers	of	asbestos	dust,	any	tangible	improvement	in	its	
legitimacy	by	its	acquiescing	was	unlikely	and	certainly	insufficient	to	encourage	
it	to	change	its	strategy	away	from	Oliver’s	hypothesised	(Dimension	1)	position	
of	resistance.		At	the	point	of	imminent	disclosure	of	the	Boards	duplicity	by	the	
Special	Commission	of	Inquiry	in	2004,	other	factors	began	to	dominate,	each	of	
which	led	to	the	adoption	of	a	strategy	of	compromise.	
Any	potential	for	economic	gain	attainable	by	acquiescence	(Dimension	2)	
was	inconceivable.	However,	once	it	became	clear	that	survival	would	only	be	
possible	if	it	began	to	compromise,	it	did	so	by	seeking	an	agreement	that	would	
minimise	the	resulting	economic	losses,	something	it	made	clear	in	its	
Explanatory	Memorandum	to	its	shareholders	in	2006.	Similarly,	nor	did	the	fact	
that	most	of	its	stakeholders	were	united	against	it	from	the	beginning	of	this	
period	cause	JH	to	change	its	position	to	one	of	acquiescence,	because	of	the	
threat	of	significant	economic	losses	if	it	did	so.	However,	when	it	was	clear	that	
the	view	was	unanimous	(Dimension	3)	it	was	left	with	no	choice	but	to	shift	
towards	a	compromise	that	might	minimise	the	economic	losses	it	faced.		
JH	had	long	before	diversified	into	other	markets,	in	which	it	was	operating	
successfully.	In	that	respect,	it	had	considerable	decision-making	discretion	
(Dimension	6).	However,	it	did	face	product	boycotts	in	its	traditional	Australian	
markets,	and	chose	to	combat	those	with	resistance	strategies;	and	it	faced	a	
very	uncertain	environment	relating	to	its	future	asbestos	liabilities	when	it	
formed	the	MRCF	(Dimension	9).	Once	it	became	aware	of	the	findings	of	the	
Special	Commission	of	Inquiry,	it	would	have	envisaged,	both	that	the	next	step	
would	be	legislative	and	that	it	would	have	no	support	in	limiting	the	extent	to	
which	sanctions	were	imposed.	At	that	point,	the	future	outlook	became	clearly	
one	of	no	future	unless	it	started	to	concede	its	position.	A	switch	to	a	
compromise	strategy	was	its	only	option.		
As	to	how	this	resonates	with	the	theories	upon	which	Oliver	built	her	
model,	institutional	theory	posits	that	numerous	aspects	of	formal	organisational	
structure,	policies,	and	procedures	result	from	prevailing	societal	attitudes	
towards	what	comprises	acceptable	practice	in	the	eyes	of	important	
constituents.93	Organisations	tend	to	obey	these	rules,	requirements	and	norms,	
not	necessarily	for	reasons	of	efficiency,	but	in	order	to	enhance	their	legitimacy,	
resources,	and	capacity	for	survival.94	Resource-based	theories	suggest	that,	“in	
general,	organizations	will	tend	to	be	influenced	by	those	who	control	the	resources	
they	require”	and,	directly	relevant	to	JH,	that	among	other	factors	“the	focal	
organization	[must	be]	capable	of	developing	actions	or	outcomes	that	will	satisfy	
the	external	demands…	[and]	desires	to	survive”.95	Consistent	with	both	these	
branches	of	theory,	it	was	a	desire	to	survive	that	drove	James	Hardie	to	finally	
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adopt	a	strategy	of	compromise	and	apologetic	communication	to	manage	the	
potentially	terminal	crisis	it	faced.	
7. Conclusions	
This	case	study	of	the	James	Hardy	asbestos	controversy	builds	upon	the	work	of	
Moerman	et	al.,96	which	dealt	with	the	period	preceding	the	time	examined	here.	
During	the	shorter,	but	more	concentrated	period	of	this	study,	the	potential	
liabilities	emerged	and	crystallised.	Four	research	questions	framed	this	study.	
The	actions	taken	by	JH	were	identified	(RQ1)	and	the	factors	that	motivated	
them	were	explored	(RQ3),	along	with	its	changing	pattern	of	public	disclosures	
(RQ2)	that	were	considered	in	the	context	of	the	literature	on	crisis	management	
and	crisis	communications	(RQ4).	
From	a	corporate	communications	perspective,97	JH	‘got	it	wrong’.	Most	
stakeholders	perceive	a	crisis	on	the	basis	of	how	something	is	framed	by	the	
media.	An	otherwise	appropriate	crisis	management	strategy	may	only	succeed	
if	its	crisis	communications	strategy	is	capable	of	shaping	the	message	being	
conveyed	in	the	media	so	that	it	looks	favourably	upon	the	focal	organisation.	
The	tobacco	industry	did	so	successfully	for	many	years	by	framing	messages	
built	around	casting	uncertainty	over	the	impact	of	smoking	on	health,	making	
statements	and	commitments	to	consumers	about	the	legitimate	concern	that	
tobacco	companies	had	for	the	overall	health	of	their	customers	and	then	being	
seen	as	a	strong	advocate	for	the	rights	of	smokers.98		
In	contrast,	JH’s	efforts	to	understate	its	culpability	and	minimise	its	
financial	obligations	could	be	compared	to	how	others	would	categorise	the	
components	of	a	shopping	list,	with	pragmatic	indifference.	Remaining	defiant	in	
the	face	of	a	barrage	of	negative	news	reports,	relying	on	the	advice	of	legal	
counsel	over	public	relations,	its	statements	and	disclosures	reflected	an	attitude	
that	was	unemotional,	distant,	conservative,	and	parsimonious.99	In	doing	so,	it	
failed	to	convince	its	stakeholders	that	its	version	of	what	had	occurred	was	
anything	but	subterfuge	and	an	unacceptable	denial	of	responsibility.	As	a	result,	
it	did	not	succeed	in	deflecting	attribution	of	the	crisis,	it	failed	to	change	
negative	perceptions	of	the	organisation	flowing	from	the	crisis,	and	it	did	not	
manage	to	reduce	the	negative	impact	generated	by	the	crisis.	Its	resistance	
tactics	only	compounded	the	crisis,	strengthening	resolve	that	the	harm	suffered	
by	its	victims	was	not	accidental,	nor	unintentional,	nor	uncontrollable,	but	
intentional	and	purposeful.	
JH	finally	acknowledged	the	need	to	change	its	strategy	to	one	of	
compromise	and	remorse	when	the	damming	findings	of	the	Special	Commission	
of	Inquiry	were	about	to	be	released,	threatening	its	survival	unless	it	did	so.	
This	led	to	its	negotiating	an	entirely	new	structure	for	compensating	asbestos	
victims	from	future	corporate	earnings;	and	undergoing	strategic	restructuring,	
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seeking	to	repair	its	organisational	legitimacy	through	executive	replacement100	
by	appointing	a	new	Chairman,	replacing	key	employees	including	the	CEO	and	
CFO,	and	revamping	the	Board	of	Directors.		
Economic	factors	drove	all	the	actions	taken	by	JH.	Initially,	a	desire	to	ring-
fence	the	company	to	protect	it	from	its	asbestos-related	liability	motivated	the	
formation	of	MRCF.	The	selection	of	response	strategies	thereafter	continued	to	
be	driven	by	what	was	perceived	as	being	the	best	approach	to	minimise	the	
economic	costs	to	the	company.	When	survival	became	the	primary	concern,	it	
too	was	pursued	in	a	manner	intended	to	minimise	the	economic	cost	to	the	
company.	In	comparison,	during	the	period	of	this	study,	companies	subject	to	
similar	claims	in	the	UK	and	the	US	were	undergoing	strategic	bankruptcies	in	
order	to	survive	as	best	they	could.	One	of	the	key	contributions	of	this	study	to	
the	literature	on	company	crises	and	company	failure	is	how	JH,	faced	with	
potentially	terminal	decline	resulting	from	the	costs	of	claims	it	might	face,	chose	
to	adopt	delaying	strategies	rather	than	Chapter	11-type	immolation	and,	as	a	
result,	survived	intact	at	the	end	of	the	process.	Yet,	while	JH’s	use	of	crisis	
management	and	crisis	communications	strategies	ultimately	secured	its	
survival,	they	were	significantly	less	effective	than	those	of	some	other	major	
companies	that	have	faced	potentially	destructive	corporate	crises.	Notably,	
Shell’s	discourse	through	major	scandals,	moved	it	“from	a	taken-for-granted	
discourse	of	economic	development	[to	one	that]	attempts	to	balance	interests	of	
economic	development	with	environmental	well-being…	[and]	opened	itself	to	such	
potentially	democratizing	discursive	forms	as	stakeholder	engagement,	dialog,	and	
social	reports”.101	Had	JH	adopted	a	similar	approach	to	Shell,	it	too	may	have	
avoided	many	of	the	adverse	consequences	upon	the	company	that	arose	from	
the	asbestos	scandal.		
8. Limitations	
This	study	relies	upon	archival	evidence	drawn	from	the	public	domain,	such	as	
annual	report	and	other	media	disclosures	by	the	company	and	the	testimonies	
and	pronouncements	that	emerged	during	the	Special	Commission	of	Inquiry.	No	
access	was	available	to	the	private	deliberations	of	the	Board	of	Directors	and	
the	management	of	JH	in	determining	their	strategic	approaches	to	the	asbestos	
issues.	Notwithstanding	this	limitation,	the	major	strategic	initiatives	pertaining	
to	this	issue	seem	to	be	readily	observable	by	analysing	the	words	and	actions	of	
JH’s	key	personnel	and,	in	particular,	the	evidence	provided	at	the	Special	
Commission	of	Inquiry.		
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